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Generally, diseases are primarily harmful to the individual herself; harm to others may or
may not be a secondary effect of diseases (e.g., in case of infectious diseases). This is also
true for mental disorders. However, both ICD-10 and DSM-5 contain two diagnoses
which are primarily defined by behavior harmful to others, namely Pedophilic Disorder and
Antisocial (or Dissocial) Personality Disorder (ASPD or DPD). Both diagnoses have severe
conceptual problems in the light of general definitions of mental disorder, like the definition
in DSM-5 or Wakefield’s “harmful dysfunction” model. We argue that in the diagnoses of
Pedophilic Disorder and ASPD the criterion of harm to the individual is substituted by the
criterion of harm to others. Furthermore, the application of the criterion of dysfunction to
these two diagnoses is problematic because both heavily depend on cultural and social
norms. Therefore, these two diagnoses fall outside the general disease concept and even
outside the general concept of mental disorders. We discuss whether diagnoses which
primarily or exclusively ground on morally wrong, socially inacceptable, or criminal
behavior should be eliminated from ICD and DSM. On the one side, if harming others is
a sufficient criterion of a mental disorder, the “evil” is pathologized. On the other side, there
are practical reasons for keeping these diagnoses: first for having an official research
frame, second for organizing and financing treatment and prevention. We argue that the
criteria set of Pedophilic Disorder should be reformulated in order to make it consistent
with the general definition of mental disorder in DSM-5. This diagnosis should only be
applicable to individuals that are distressed or impaired by it, but not solely based on
behavior harmful to others. For ASPD, we conclude that the arguments for eliminating it
from the diagnostic manuals overweigh the arguments for keeping it.
Keywords: antisocial personality disorder, psychopathy, dissocial personality disorder, pedophilic disorder,
pedophilia, diagnostic criteria, definition of mental disorder, harmful behaviorg September 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 5586551
4A psychiatric diagnosis per se is not a reason for assuming a lack of criminal
Münch et al. Behavior Harmful to OthersINTRODUCTION
Generally, diseases are primarily harmful to the diseased individual
herself either by being directly life-threatening or at least life-
shortening, or by causing pain or suffering, or by impairing her
ability to live in human symbiotic communities (1). Harm to
others, however, may or may not be a secondary effect of diseases.
A typical example are infectious diseases which harm the infected
individual and possibly others as well. Amere infection, however, is
not called a disease as long as it is not and will not be harmful to the
infected individual herself, even if it poses a risk to others as a
secondary effect. This is evident from the example of asymptomatic
carriers of pathogens. Although they may transmit the pathogen to
others and harm particularly vulnerable, e.g. immunosuppressed
people, medicine does not regard them as ill.1 Therefore, such
persons should be described as being ‘disease-causing’ for others,
rather than as being ‘diseased’ themselves.
If this is true for diseases in general, that they are primarily
harmful to the individual herself, it should also be true for mental
disorders as long as they are viewed as a subset of diseases. This is
reflected in frequently cited attempts to formulate a general
definition of mental disorder, like the definition in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
5) (3) or the “harmful dysfunction”model byWakefield (4). Both
definitions characterize a mental disorder by, broadly speaking, a
dysfunction in mental processes that is associated with harm to
the affected individual.
For some psychiatric diagnoses, however, it is questionable
whether the presupposition of harm to the individual really applies.
We will show that several diagnoses essentially rely on behavior
that is harmful to others, but not necessarily to the individual
herself. This is especially true for the diagnoses “Antisocial
Personality Disorder” (ASPD) in DSM-5 (or “Dissocial
Personality Disorder” in ICD-10) and “Pedophilic Disorder” in
DSM-5 and ICD-11.2 Instead, as we will show, another disease
criterion comes in here: the criterion of “harm to others”.
In the case of Pedophilic Disorder, harm to others is a sufficient
criterion. In the case of ASPD, it is a necessary one and, as we will
argue, practically also a sufficient one. In addition to the harm
criterion, getting another meaning, we will argue that the criterion
of a mental dysfunction is unclear in these diagnoses. Thus, the
diagnoses of ASPD and Pedophilic Disorder fall out of the general
concept of diseases and even out of the general concept of mental
disorders. Are they accordingly rather “moral disorders” than
clinical disorders?3 If this is true, psychiatry contributes to a
“medicalization” of morally wrong behavior (6). The conceptual1Contrary to medical mainstream opinion, Hucklenbroich regards asymptomatic
carriers of infectious diseases as ill. According to his theory (see The general
concept of disease), asymptomatic carriers fall within the scope of disease criterion
5 (2).
2The rationale of our argumentation applies to other diagnoses as well, like for
example “Coercive sexual sadism disorder” in ICD-11. We have chosen Pedophilic
Disorder and ASPD because they are the most questioned and relevant diagnoses.
3Charland (5) argues that only the personality disorders in Clusters A and C are
genuine clinical disorders. In contrast, he considers the Cluster B disorders (which
include antisocial, borderline, histrionic, and narcissistic personality disorder) as
moral disorders since their definitions are “morally loaded” and they require
“moral treatment”.
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fundamental question which criteria define a mental disorder.
The aim of this paper is to discuss whether behavior harmful
to others should be a sufficient criterion of mental disorder as it is
the case in the diagnoses of ASPD and Pedophilic Disorder. If we
come to the conclusion that this should not be the case, the
question arises whether ASPD and Pedophilic Disorder should
be eliminated from the diagnostic manuals.MENTAL DISORDERS AND THEIR
DIAGNOSTIC MANUALS
In probably no other specialty of medicine has the concept of
“disease” been as contested as in psychiatry. Even though in
psychiatry the term “disorder” is predominantly used, it can be
regarded as synonymous to “disease”, especially regarding the
practical consequences. Apart from the fundamental question
whether there’s such a thing as “mental disorders” at all (7), and
hence, whether psychiatry is a part of medicine at all, the nature
and definition of mental disorders in general have been discussed
(4, 8, 9). Other controversies concern the disorder status of specific
mental conditions, the most famous example probably being the
removal of homosexuality from DSM in 1973 (10, 11). A still
missing stringent scientific basis and the important role of values
(12) bring psychiatry into a position to constantly question its own
presumptions about the concept of mental disorder.
Mental disorders are classified in two classification systems:
First, the International Classification of Diseases and Related
Health Problems, 10th revision (ICD-10), by the World Health
Organization (WHO) (13). Second, for mental disorders only, the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edition
(DSM-5), published by the American Psychiatric Association
(APA) (3). The latter is “viewed as representing the cutting-edge
of the field” (14). Both manuals define the current state of the art
in psychiatric diagnostics and thus have a huge impact on clinical
use but also on public discussions about mental health and finally,
through their use in forensic settings, even on court rulings. The
practical implications of the diagnostic manuals thus range from
the funding of treatments by the public health system to the
assessment of someone’s capacity to work, and indirectly to the
evaluation of diminished criminal responsibility.4responsibility or diminished responsibility but it is part of the forensic examination.
According to German criminal law, “[a] person acts without guilt who, at the time the
criminal act is committed, is incapable of understanding the wrongfulness of his or her
action or is incapable of acting in accordance with this understanding due to mental
illness, due to a profound disturbance of consciousness, or due to mental retardation or
another serious mental abnormality” [Section 20, German Criminal Code, English
translation cited from (15)]. Diminished responsibility is present in the case of a
diminished capability of the offender to understand the wrongfulness of an action or to
act in accordancewith this understanding due to one of the reasons indicated in Section
20 and may lead to mitigated penalty (Section 21, German Criminal Code). Section 20
lists four mental conditions that are necessary prerequisites for assuming a lack of
criminal responsibility. However, these mental conditions are not equivalent to specific
psychiatric diagnoses. They are legal terms that refer to psychiatric diagnoses (16).
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criteria sets, of which a specified number of criteria needs to
apply for a specified period of time. Since the neurobiological
underpinnings and the etiology of many mental disorders are
still scarcely understood, the diagnostic criteria sets consist of
observable and subjective symptoms. Contrary to most cases in
“somatic medicine”, there are only few additional objective tests
in psychiatry to support a suspected diagnosis (e.g. for dementias
or autoimmune encephalitis).
Given their importance in the diagnostic process, the
selection and exact formulation of the criteria of mental
disorders are crucial. Changes in these criteria sets have a huge
impact on the prevalence of certain mental disorders and on the
lives of many individuals. It is thus not surprising that every
revision of the diagnostic manuals is accompanied by extended
controversies about the inclusion or elimination of diagnoses and
the formulation of the diagnostic criteria sets (17, 18). Frances
(19), for example, sharply criticizes a “diagnostic inflation” in
psychiatry which he thinks was intensified by DSM-5 by adding
more diagnoses and expanding the existing ones.6It was proposed to include the attraction to pubescent children and rename the
diagnosis “pedohebephilic disorder”, to include a victim count and the use of child
pornography in criterion B, and to include the specifiers “in remission” and “inMENTAL DISORDERS HARMFUL TO
OTHERS
The most contested diagnoses in DSM and ICD are probably
the paraphilias (20) and Cluster B-personality disorders (5).5
Especially Pedophilic Disorder and Antisocial Personality
Disorder (ASPD) or Dissocial Personality Disorder (in ICD-
10) are highly controversial diagnoses. Some authors question
their status as clinical disorders [for ASPD, see Charland (5)] or
even their place in the manuals [for Pedophilic Disorder, see
Green (22)].
Pedophilic Disorder and ASPD are particularly contested
because both diagnoses are highly linked to socially deviant or
even criminal behavior. Persons with ASPD and pedophilic
sexual offenders have a significantly increased risk of (re-)
offending (23–25). Sadler (26) calls such diagnoses “vice-laden”
disorders, vice being understood in a “technical sense—as simply
criminal and/or immoral thought or conduct” (p. 452) by the
legal and moral standards of the respective society. The notion of
“vice-ladenness” indicates that those disorders imply thoughts
and behaviors typically described and assessed in moral and/or
legal rather than in medical terms.
Pedophilic Disorder and ASPD are not the only mental
disorders associated with behaviors usually described in moral
terms and potentially harmful to others, though. A person
suffering from schizophrenia, for example, will presumably show
in some way socially deviant behavior andmay even cause harm to
others when, for example, following the commands of imperative
voices. The crucial point, however, is that in the case of
schizophrenia the symptoms described in the diagnostic criteria5 The general concept of the personality disorders has been criticized
fundamentally. Lieb criticizes the concept of personality disorder as
contradictory in itself and as harmful to the patient and to the therapeutic
relationship (21).
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 3set are “relatively immune to misconstrual as vice” (6) (p. 9).
Immoral or harmful behavior is not a defining criterion of the
disorder, rather it may or may not be a secondary effect of it. In
contrast, for ASPD and Pedophilic Disorder, behavior that is
morally wrong and primarily harmful to others is a central part
of the diagnosis: they are “vice-laden” at their core.
Pedophilic Disorder
In DSM-IV, the diagnosis of pedophilia required that the fantasies,
sexual urges, or behaviors involving children cause clinically
significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other
important areas of functioning (Criterion B). This criterion was
changed in DSM-IV-TR so that it was then sufficient to have acted
on the sexual urges. From DSM-IV-TR to DSM-5, all criteria
remained unchanged after the proposed changes were declined
(27, 28) (Table 1).6
DSM-5, however, introduced a distinction between
Pedophilia and Pedophilic Disorder. Pedophilia denotes the
mere sexual preference for prepubescent children (Criterion A)
and is not considered a mental disorder anymore. Pedophilic
Disorder is Pedophilia with either personal distress or
interpersonal difficulty, or sexual acts involving prepubescent
children (Criterion B).
ICD-11, which has been presented by theWHO in 2019 and will
foreseeably come into effect on 1 January 2022, adjusted the criteria
of “Pedophilic Disorder” to the DSM-5 criteria (Table 2). Except for
the time criterion (the sexual attraction to children must be present
for at least 6 months), which is only required in DSM-5, the criteria
in ICD-11 and DSM-5 are basically the same (Tables 1 and 2).
The age limit mentioned by DSM-5 (13 years) is clearly below
the age of sexual consent, which ranges between 14 and 18 years
in most countries (in the US states, for example, it ranges
between 16 and 18 years). This means that the criterion of
“has acted on these sexual urges” is equivalent to committing a
criminal act.
This, however, does not apply to all countries in the world.
According to the UNICEF child marriage report from 2014,
about 250 million women alive today were married before age 15
(35). In some countries, this is even covered by law as it is
allowed to marry before age 18 (in some cases there is no
minimum age at all) under certain circumstances (36). This
shows that not in every country sexual intercourse with children
age 13 or younger is considered a criminal offense. Therefore, the
legal and social reactions which individuals, who sexually abuse
children, will have to face differ. Of course, even though tolerated
by law in some countries, sexual acts involving children are
harmful and should be legally forbidden all over the world.
Most researchers emphasize the difference between pedophilic
interests and sexual offending against children. Not all individualscontrolled environment” (31). After the refusal of these changes, it was criticized
that Pedophilic Disorder is the only Paraphilic Disorder in DSM-5 that lacks the
specifiers “in full remission” and “in controlled environment” (32, 33). Further
criticism was directed against the refusal to include the attraction to pubescent
children (27). These discussions, however, are not in the focus of this paper.
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child molesters have “recurrent and intense” pedophilic interests;
about half of the cases of sexual abuse of children are committed
by presumably non-pedophilic offenders.7
However, both criteria A and B of Pedophilic Disorder
contain a behavioral aspect that is sufficient for the respective7Data on the proportion of pedophilic and non-pedophilic child sexual offenders
are quite scarce and come from small studies. According to Seto et al. (37), in a
sample of 100 child pornography offenders (where the authors assumed a high
probability of pedophilic interest due to phallometric responses), 57% were not
known to have had sexual contact with children. Conversely, the prevalence of
pedophilic preference among identified child sexual offenders is estimated at about
40–50% (based on their sexual arousal to stimuli depicting children or their sexual
offense history) (23). First (38) notes that “compared with other paraphilic
disorders, child molestation is even more likely to occur for nonparaphilic
reasons”. Nonparaphilic reasons may be “a lack of more preferred sexual
opportunities, hypersexuality, indiscriminate sexual interests, or disinhibition as
a result of substance use or other factors” (23) (p. 393). Knack et al. (39) name “a
general anti-social orientation”, “a sexual interest in coercion”, “attitudes
accepting of sex between adults and children”, and “indiscriminate or
opportunistic sexual behaviours” as reasons for non-pedophilic child sexual
abuse (p. 183). Strassberg et al. found that non-pedophilic child molesters are
more likely to show psychopathic traits than pedophilic child molesters (40).
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“behaviors” in criterion A makes it possible to meet this criterion
solely by repeated acts of sexual behavior involving children (38).
Regarding criterion B, sexual acts involving children are also
sufficient to fulfill this criterion. This means that repeated sexual
behavior involving children is sufficient to fulfill both criteria.
According to the criteria in DSM-5 and ICD-11, a diagnosis
of Pedophilic Disorder requires neither suffering from the sexual
fantasies, urges, or behaviors towards children nor experiencing
any impairment in social, occupational or other important
activities. The diagnosis can be made solely on grounds of
behavior harmful to others. This has been criticized as a
confusion of “mental disorder” and “crime” (20) or “immoral
behavior” (41).
Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD)
In an attempt to define reliably measurable personality traits, the
DSM focused on behavior in the definition of ASPD, which was
intended to be an equivalent of psychopathy (3, 42). Psychopathy,
conceptualized by the Hare Psychopathy Checklist Revised
(PCL-R) (24), contains much more interpersonal and affective
symptoms than ASPD (25, 43) but is not a diagnosis in ICD-10 or
DSM-5 (44).8 Almost all criteria of ASPD in DSM-5 refer to
behavior primarily harmful to others (Table 3). In accordance
with the diagnostic criteria required for all personality disorders,
the antisocial personality traits must be “inflexible, maladaptive,
and persistent and cause significant functional impairment or
subjective distress” (3).
The equivalent of ASPD in ICD-10, Dissocial Personality
Disorder (DPD), refers less to behavioral and more to affective
symptoms than ASPD in its criteria set (25) (Table 3). However,
as Kröber and Lau (15) note, most of the criteria can still be
“easily derived from the criminal behavior itself” (p. 681).TABLE 1 | Comparison of the diagnostic criteria of pedophilic disorder and pedophilia in the DSM-IV, DSM-IV-TR, and DSM-5.
DSM-IV—Pedophilia (302.2) DSM-IV-TR—Pedophilia (302.2) DSM-5—Pedophilic Disorder (302.2)
A. Over a period of at least 6 months, recurrent,
intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or
behaviors involving sexual activity with a prepubescent
child or children (generally age 13 years or younger).
B. The fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors cause
clinically significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
C. The person is at least age 16 years and at least 5
years older than the child or children in Criterion A.
Note: Do not include an individual in late adolescence
involved in an ongoing sexual relationship with a 12- or
13-year-old. (29)
A. Over a period of at least 6 months, recurrent,
intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or
behaviors involving sexual activity with a prepubescent
child or children (generally age 13 years or younger).
B. The person has acted on these sexual urges, or the
sexual urges or fantasies cause marked distress or
interpersonal difficulty.
C. The person is at least age 16 years and at least 5
years older than the child or children in Criterion A.
Note: Do not include an individual in late adolescence
involved in an ongoing sexual relationship with a 12- or
13-year-old. (30)
A. Over a period of at least 6 months, recurrent,
intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or
behaviors involving sexual activity with a prepubescent
child or children (generally age 13 years or younger).
B. The individual has acted on these sexual urges, or
the sexual urges or fantasies cause marked distress or
interpersonal difficulty.
C. The person is at least age 16 years and at least 5
years older than the child or children in Criterion A.
Note: Do not include an individual in late adolescence
involved in an ongoing sexual relationship with a 12- or
13-year-old. (3)8ASPD and psychopathy
(25), 81% of persons diagn
whereas only 38% of the p
This indicates that the po
more or less be considere
ASPD. Exceptions are typ
offenders”) who are psyc
antisocial personality disoText that has been changed from the previous version is shown in italics.TABLE 2 | Comparison of the diagnostic criteria of pedophilic disorder and
pedophilia in ICD-10 and ICD-11.
ICD-10— Pedophilia (F 65.4) ICD-11 – Pedophilic Disorder (6D32)
A sexual preference for children,
usually of prepubertal or early
pubertal age. Some pedophiles are
attracted only to girls, others only to
boys, and others again are interested
in both sexes. (13)
Pedophilic disorder is characterized by a
sustained, focused, and intense pattern
of sexual arousal—as manifested by
persistent sexual thoughts, fantasies,
urges, or behaviors—involving pre-
pubertal children.
In addition, in order for Pedophilic
Disorder to be diagnosed, the individual
must have acted on these thoughts,
fantasies or urges or be markedly
distressed by them.
This diagnosis does not apply to sexual
behaviors among pre- or post-pubertal
children with peers who are close in age.
(34)Text that has been changed from the previous version is shown in italics.are largely overlapping concepts. According to Ogloff
osed with psychopathy also meet the criteria of ASPD,
ersons with ASPD receive a diagnosis of psychopathy.
pulation of persons diagnosed with psychopathy can
d a subset of the population of persons diagnosed with
ically fraudulent personalities (or so-called “white collar
hopaths but do not meet the criteria of dissocial or
rder (45).
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that “the disorder leads to considerable personal distress but this
may only become apparent late in its course” and “the disorder is
usually, but not invariably, associated with significant problems in
occupational and social performance” (13) (p. 202).9
However, Habermeyer states that persons with antisocial or
dissocial personality traits subjectively do not suffer from their
abnormalities and show little willingness to get treated (16).
This is accentuated for inmates with high values on the
Psychopathy Checklist (16). Many, if not the overwhelming
majority of subjects with psychopathy are perfectly content
with and identify with their traits; there is no subjective
suffering involved in psychopathy (42). Because there is
nothing painful or ego-dystonic in psychopathic symptoms, it
is unlikely that a psychopath would seek or endure treatment
(42). Also persons with ASPD rarely seek treatment (43, 46),
indicating that they usually do not feel significantly distressed
or impaired by their condition. This becomes evident from the
description of the self-image of people with dissocial or
antisocial personality traits by Müller-Isberner et al.: “These
people generally see themselves as autonomous, strong loners.
Some see themselves as exploited and mistreated by society and
justify harming others by saying that they themselves are being
harassed. Others see themselves as robbers in a world where the
motto is ‘eat and be eaten’ or ‘the winner takes it all’ and where
it is normal or even desirable and necessary to violate social
rules.”10 (47) (p. 373).
This raises the question whether the diagnosis of ASPD could
be made for anyone at all if the criteria of subjective distress and/
or functional impairment were strictly applied. In clinical
practice, distress can be presumed if someone seeks help9For the sake of clarity, we will mainly refer to Antisocial Personality Disorder in
this paper, even though many of the points made equally apply to Dissocial
Personality Disorder. However, because of the stronger focus on behavior in ASPD
compared with Dissocial Personality Disorder, we consider the diagnosis of ASPD
as more problematic.
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 5voluntarily. The question is why this person seeks help and
what distresses her. According to the literature on antisocial
personality cited above, it is probably not her antisocial
personality. However, subjective distress “in general” is not
sufficient to make this specific diagnosis, even if all the other
criteria of ASPD apply. According to DSM-5, the subjective
distress must be caused by the antisocial personality traits.
It could be objected that a lack of personal distress in ASPD is
precisely part of its psychopathology, in the sense that not
recognizing one’s own problems is even more pathological than
recognizing them. However, the general problem with this
argument is that it allows the attribution of mental disorders
to persons without personal distress from the outside. Even
though there are cases in which this can be justified (e.g. in the
case of severe psychosis/delusions where the individual doesn’t
recognize her psychosis/delusions), there is a high risk of
misusing psychiatric diagnoses for pathologizing socially deviant
or nonconformist behavior.
The questionable personal distress in ASPD is especially
relevant in the forensic context where the prevalence of ASPD
is much higher than in the general population. The base rate in
the population is estimated at 2%, whereas the prevalence
among male prisoners is estimated at between 47 and 80%
(25, 48). Prisoners are certainly distressed. However, distress
because of the legally justified consequences of antisocial
behavior, like a loss of freedom, must not be confused with
distress because of the antisocial personality traits themselves
(49). Distress because of society’s negative reaction to deviant
behavior is not a sign of a mental disorder. Rather, it is normal.
We suspect that the criterion of subjective distress and/or
impairment often is not considered correctly when the
diagnosis of ASPD is made, especially not in forensic
contexts. The great difference between the prevalence of
ASPD in the general population and among male prisoners
indicates a strong correlation between ASPD and imprisonments.TABLE 3 | Comparison of the diagnostic criteria of Antisocial Personality Disorder (DSM-5) and Dissocial Personality Disorder (ICD-10).
DSM-5—Antisocial Personality Disorder (301.7) ICD-10—Dissocial Personality Disorder (F60.2)
A. A pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others, occurring
since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of the following:
1. Failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors, as indicated
by repeatedly performing acts that are ground for arrest.
2. Deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for
personal profit or pleasure.
3. Impulsivity or failure to plan ahead.
4. Irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults.
5. Reckless disregard for safety of self or others.
6. Consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent
work behavior or honor financial obligations.
7. Lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt,
mistreated or stolen from another.
B. The individual is at least age 18 years.
C. There is evidence of conduct disorder with onset before age 15 years.
D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course of
schizophrenia or bipolar disorder.
Personality disorder, usually coming to attention because of a gross disparity
between behavior and the prevailing social norms, and characterized by (at least
three of the following criteria)
1. Callous unconcern for the feelings of others.
2. Gross and persistent attitude of irresponsibility and disregard for social
norms, rules, and obligations.
3. Incapacity to maintain enduring relationships, though having no difficulty in
establishing them.
4. Very low tolerance to frustration and a low threshold for discharge of
aggression, including violence.
5. Incapacity to experience guilt, or to profit from adverse experience,
particularly punishment.
6. Marked proneness to blame others, or to offer plausible rationalizations for
the behavior bringing the subject into conflict with society.
There may be persistent irritability as an associated feature. Conduct disorder
during childhood and adolescence, though not invariably present, may further
support the diagnosis.10Translated by Sabine Müller.
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or that ASPD is a construct mainly depicting criminal behavior.
We conclude that, strictly speaking, many persons diagnosed
with ASPD in fact only have antisocial personality traits, which are
not a mental disorder according to DSM-5. This conclusion is
supported by the observation of Herpertz that a lack of considering
the general definition of personality disorder and instead a focus on
the easily applicable specific criteria lists led to an “inflationary
diagnosis frequency” of personality disorders (50).We suspect that,
especially in the case of ASPD, many persons are mistakenly
classified as “mentally ill” because of a wrongful interpretation or
even neglect of the distress/impairment criterion.
ICD-10 and DSM-5 present a categorial classification of
personality disorders with ASPD/Dissocial Personality Disorder
being a distinct disorder-entity. This categorial approach to
personality disorders, however, is broadly contested (50). DSM-5
already introduced an alternative “hybrid” model for personality
disorders, mixing categorial and dimensional approaches.11
According to the alternative model, the typical features of
ASPD are “a failure to conform to lawful and ethical behavior, and
an egocentric, callous lack of concern for others, accompanied by
deceitfulness, irresponsibility, manipulative-ness, and/or risk
taking” (p. 763). Psychopathy is described as a distinct variant
that is “marked by a lack of anxiety or fear and by a bold
interpersonal style that may mask maladaptive behaviors (e.g.,
fraudulence).” (3) (p. 765).
ICD-11 goes even further in replacing the categorial model by a
dimensional one (50). According to this model, the diagnosis of a
personality disorder comprises three steps. First, the general
criteria of a personality disorder must be met (“problems in
functioning of aspects of the self […], and/or interpersonal
dysfunction […] that have persisted over an extended period of
time (e.g., 2 years or more)”, “the disturbance is manifest in
patterns of cognition, emotional experience, emotional expression,
and behaviour that are maladaptive”, “the disturbance is
associated with substantial distress or significant impairment in
personal, family, social, educational, occupational or other
important areas of functioning” (34)). Then, the severity of this
general personality disorder must be determined (mild, moderate,11The alternative model for personality disorders in DSM-5 has been developed
for further research (Section III). In the alternative model, personality disorders
are generally characterized by impairments in personality functioning (Criterion
A) and pathological personality traits (Criterion B). Personality functioning
(Criterion A) involves self-functioning (identity and self-direction) and
interpersonal functioning (empathy and intimacy). For each of these four
elements, five levels of impairment (ranging from no impairment to extreme
impairment) can be differentiated. Pathological personality traits (Criterion B) are
organized in five broad domains, namely negative affectivity, detachment,
antagonism, disinhibition, and psychotism. The impairments in personality
functioning and personality trait expression are relatively inflexible and
pervasive across a broad range of personal and social situations (Criterion C).
They are relatively stable with onset in at least adolescence or early adulthood
(Criterion D), cannot be better explained by another mental disorder (Criterion
E), are not attributable to the physiological effects of a substance or another
medical condition (Criterion F), and not better understood as normal for an
individual’s developmental stage or sociocultural environment (Criterion G) (3)
(pp. 761–3).
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assessed according to five personality domains (negative
affectivity, detachment, dissociality, disinhibition, anakastia).
Thus, in ICD-11, there will be no category “Dissocial Personality
Disorder” anymore. Instead, dissocial and disinhibited traits and
behaviors may be a specifier among others in a diagnosis of a
(general) personality disorder.Interim Conclusion
In both the definitions of ASPD and Pedophilic Disorder
behavior harmful to others or even criminal behavior is a
criterion for the diagnosis of a mental disorder. For Pedophilic
Disorder, even though harming others (for a period of at least 6
months) is not a necessary criterion, it can be a sufficient one. For
ASPD, repeated harming of others is a necessary criterion, and—
not formally, but practically—also a sufficient one.
The key question is: Should criminal behavior/harm to others
be a sufficient criterion of a mental disorder? Or does this lead
to a “medicalization” of vice conditions, meaning that “all
problematic deviance reflects human illness or injury,
including criminality and ‘immoral’ conduct” (6) (p. 12)? The
crucial point is: can behavior harmful to others alone indicate the
presence of a mental disorder? Or is this rather an attempt to
“pathologize the morally wrong”? We will come back to this
question later.
The conceptual problems of Pedophilic Disorder and ASPD
lead directly to a more fundamental question: which criteria
define a mental disorder?THE DEFINITION OF MENTAL DISORDER
The General Concept of Disease
If psychiatry claims to be a part of medicine, a general definition
of disease should be the basis of a definition of mental disorders.
Hucklenbroich developed a profound reconstruction of the
general concept of disease (51). He distinguishes four levels of
the concept of disease. The first level is the life-world and
personal concept of disease (person X is ill). On the second
level, a distinction can be made between healthy and pathological
life processes (X is pathological). At the third level, reference is
made to a standard model of the human organism (X is
pathologically altered). At the fourth level, disease entities and
categories are postulated (X is a disease). The basis of the
determination of disease entities is an etiopathogenetic model
that comprises an identification of primary causes and the typical
clinical course.
According to this reconstruction, life processes that meet four
criteria can be described as pathological: 1. They are states,
processes, or procedures in individuals, 2. which are attributable
to the organism, not the environment, 3. which take place
independently of the will and knowledge of the affected
individuals, and 4. for which there is at least one non-
pathological alternative course.September 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 558655
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distinguishes positive and negative disease criteria. Positive
criteria of a disease are: 1. lethality; 2. pain, discomfort,
suffering; 3. disposition for 1 or 2; 4. inability to reproduce; 5.
inability to live together. The two negative criteria of disease,
which determine a condition as non-pathological, are 1.
universal occurrence and inevitability, e.g. gender, intrauterine
and ontogenetic phases, pregnancy, menopause, old age, natural
death; 2. knowingly and intentionally self-induced behavior (as
long as self-determination is not diminished), e.g. suicide, value
judgements, risky behavior, abstinence, intentional lying.
Hucklenbroich argues that this general concept of disease
also applies to mental disorders, even though an etiopathogenetic
disease model like in “somatic” medicine is still missing in
psychiatry (2). According to his model, especially the positive
criteria 2 and 5 are relevant for mental disorders. Mental
disorders are often associated with significant pain, discomfort
or suffering. Additionally, they may impair the ability to live
together with others in a community. However, Hucklenbroich
notes that due to the lack of knowledge about the
etiopathogenesis of mental disorders there are still diverging
concepts of mental disorder (2).
The DSM-5 Definition of Mental Disorder
One of the mostly cited definitions of mental disorder is given in
DSM-5. While conceding that “no definition can capture all
aspects of all disorders in the range contained in DSM-5” (3)
(p. 20), it is stated that the definition is rather meant to formulate
elements required for considering something a mental disorder:Fronti“A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by
clinically significant disturbance in an individual’s
cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that
reflects a dysfunction in the psychological,
biological, or developmental processes underlying
mental functioning. Mental disorders are usually
associated with significant distress or disability in
social, occupational, or other important activities.
An expectable or culturally approved response to a
common stressor or loss, such as the death of a loved
one, is not a mental disorder. Socially deviant behavior
(e.g. political, religious, or sexual) and conflicts that are
primarily between the individual and society are not
mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict results
from a dysfunction in the individual, as described
above.” (3) (p. 20, emphasis added)12As soon as a crime is committed against an individual person, the perpetrator
comes into conflict not only with the victim but also with the society whose moral
or legal norms have been violated.
13As an example, in Germany there were fierce debates about the harmfulness of
sexual interactions between adults and children in the 1960s to the 1980s. Some
sexologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists denied the harmfulness of sexual
interactions with children (52). Pedophilic activists demanded the abolition of
the legal age limit of sexual interactions, a position that was supported even by
several leaders of the Green party (53).The definition starts with 1. an observable symptom level
(“clinically significant disturbance”) that is 2. caused by
an underlying dysfunction in the “mental domain” of an
individual, and that has 3. some expected consequences,
namely distress or disability in important activities of daily life.
The rest of the definition specifies circumstances under which
certain conditions are not deemed mental disorders: Socially
deviant behavior and conflicts between the individual and
society, which are not the result of a dysfunction, are not
considered mental disorders.ers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 7The last point seems to be crucial. Pedophilic Disorder and
ASPD are, prima facie, conditions that are mainly based on a
conflict between the individual and other individuals and/or
society.12 A person with Pedophilic Disorder could argue that his
sexual orientation simply does not fit in his society’s current
concepts of approved sexual relationships while denying that
sexual contacts with children are actually harmful to them.13 Or a
person diagnosed with ASPD could argue that he does not feel
bothered by his antisocial behavior because he has many
advantages by it, although he might come into conflict with
the law unless he is careful.
According to DSM-5, socially deviant behavior can be a sign
of a mental disorder only if it results from a dysfunction in the
individual’s “psychological, biological, or developmental
processes underlying mental functioning”. However, the
behavioral symptoms described in the diagnoses of ASPD and
Pedophilic Disorder can have very different causes. Indeed, the
lack of differentiation between the different causes of mental
disorders is a fundamental problem of the nominalistic approach
of DSM and ICD.
If hypersexual and even pedophilic behavior occurred in
previously normal people after a brain tumor, a brain trauma,
or epilepsy surgery, the brain pathology probably causally
contributed to the abnormal behavior (54, 55). This is reflected
in the differentiation between “developmental” and “acquired”
pedophilia in the literature where acquired pedophilia is
etiologically associated with a structural brain abnormality and
developmental pedophilia is not (54, 56). However, the
diagnostic manuals do not differentiate between these two
types of pedophilia, as the diagnoses are symptom-based and
do not consider etiology.
Also for antisocial behavior, there are associations between
damage of the prefrontal cortex, be it due to a head injury or due
to neurodegeneration like in Frontotemporal Dementia, and the
occurrence of antisocial behavior in previously normal people
(57). Cases of severe ventromedial prefrontal lobe epilepsy have
been described that were associated with persistent antisocial
behavior that was reversible after epilepsy surgery (58). In these
cases, abnormal behavior is associated with a brain pathology
which suggests a causal link between this pathology and the
deviant behavior.
On the other hand, someone can behave in the same way for
completely different reasons. For example, someone could live in
a subculture where it is normal to behave in an antisocial or even
criminal way to be “successful”. If it is normal in the social
environment to make a living from, for example, drug dealing or
criminal financial transactions, it could be reasonable to follow
this tradition. Another example is someone who showsSeptember 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 558655
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himself due to money and power. In these cases, there is no
reason to assume an underlying pathology. It is rather a morally
questionable behavior.
The point here is: the fact that there are cases of brain
pathologies leading to disinhibited or antisocial behavior
doesn’t imply that all people behaving in the same way have a
brain pathology.
Wakefield’s “Harmful Dysfunction” Model
The question of the underlying dysfunction in ASPD and
Pedophilic Disorder seems to be crucial for defending their status
as mental disorders. A frequently cited concept related to the DSM
definition of mental disorder is Wakefield’s “harmful dysfunction”
model (4). This model assumes that a mental condition can be
classified as a mental disorder when two criteria apply: Firstly, it is
the result of a dysfunction, understood in an evolutionary sense as
the failure of a process to perform the function it was biologically
designed for; secondly, it is harmful to the individual according to
sociocultural standards (4). By this definition, Wakefield tries to
escape definitional problems by combining, as he calls it, a “value
term” (harm) and a “scientific and factual” term (dysfunction) (4).
The idea is to evade two problems: On the one hand, a mere
“scientific” concept of mental disorder leads to the problem that
every deviation from a scientifically defined standard could be
viewed as a mental disorder even though the affected individual is
neither suffering nor impaired. On the other hand, a mere value-
based concept of mental disorders entails the risk of pathologizing
socially disvalued behavior. Thus, according to Wakefield, only a
harmful dysfunction represents a mental disorder, not a
dysfunction without any harm to the individual nor something
evaluated as harmful (according to sociocultural standards) but
without representing a dysfunction.
We will come back to the notion of dysfunction in Pedophilic
Disorder and ASPD later. Regarding the harm criterion, ASPD and
Pedophilic Disorder are special since most mental disorders are
primarily harmful to the affected individual. For “vice-laden”
disorders like ASPD and Pedophilic Disorder, however, the
“harm-criterion” primarily concerns others. Of course, some
persons with Pedophilic Disorder might experience personal
distress, probably after having internalized the society’s negative
attitude towards pedophilia. Some persons with ASPD, however,
may even enjoy real benefits through their special personality traits,
both in terms of income and reproductive success. Malon (11)
introduces the concept of “dangerous dysfunction” instead of
“harmful dysfunction” in the case of Pedophilic Disorder,
arguing that it is actually the concept of “dangerous dysfunction”
that explains the presence of Pedophilic Disorder in DSM.
Alternative Definitions of Mental Disorder
In the diagnoses of ASPD and Pedophilic Disorder, harm to the
individual in the sense of personal distress or impairment is not
necessarily implied. However, harm to the individual might be
present even without the person concerned being aware of it. The
philosopher Graham (59) states that having a mental disorder
does not necessarily comprise the recognition of its harmfulness
by the affected individual herself. According to Graham, a mentalFrontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 8disorder is a disability, dysfunction or impairment in one or
more basic mental or psychological faculties or capacities of a
person that has harmful or potentially harmful consequences for
the person concerned (59) (p. 28). It is a disorder because it is
harmful in the sense that the person is worse off with the disorder
than without the disorder, that she cannot control it, and that it
cannot be removed by using additional psychological resources,
e.g. by simply “pulling oneself together”.
Insofar, a person with Pedophilic Disorder could be regarded
as worse off with the disorder than without it because having it
means that either he has to abstain from fulfilling sexual
relationships his whole life or he will commit a criminal act
and possibly be punished for it. However, this argument is valid
only for pedophilic persons living in societies which condemn
and regularly punish child sexual abuse. In the case of ASPD, one
could argue that the person is worse off with the disorder than
without it because he is, for example, not able to have good
relationships with other people. This, however, presupposes a
certain model of good relationships and a “good life”, and
therefore is value-laden and moralistic.
Heinz et al. (60, 61) argue for a differentiation between mental
diseases in a narrow sense and states of suffering or disorders in a
broader sense that do not meet the criteria of a disease. This
differentiation, however, is not made by DSM and ICD where the
notion of mental disorder is used for all diagnoses. Heinz et al.
demand that the notion of mental disease should only be applied
when life-relevant functional abilities are impaired and the
affected person suffers from it or is impaired in her ability to
cope with everyday life. Applying such a standard, many
currently classifiable disorders are not diseases in this sense
(60, 61). However, they are more or less easily classifiable
states of suffering for which psychotherapeutic help and
possibly drugs can be offered (60, 61). In this sense, Pedophilic
Disorder and ASPD are not mental diseases.
What is a Mental Dysfunction?
The concept of mental dysfunction is central in most definitions
of mental disorder. However, there is no consistent definition of
this concept. For example, DSM-5 uses the notion of dysfunction
without elucidating it.
Schramme (62) distinguishes four models of mental
functions. The first model, for which Wakefield’s concept of
dysfunction is the most prominent example, is based on
evolutionary psychology. According to Wakefield, mental
functions result from selection processes and thus enable
individuals to solve problems of adaptation (4). Schramme
rightly criticizes the historical orientation of this theory: Some
processes may have been adaptive to past environments but not
to our present environment. The second model of mental
functions comes from cognitive psychology. Functions in this
sense are best understood in formal terms as “input–output-
relations”, not in any teleological sense. Schramme notes that this
theory hardly applies to the concept of mental disorder, because
it does not imply “normativity”, that means, it has no concept of
how a mental function should work, and thus no concept of
dysfunction. The third model supports a goal theory of function
and is close to Boorse’s disease theory that identifies survival andSeptember 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 558655
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functions are thus understood through their relation to these
goals. In contrast to evolutionary psychology, this model does
not refer to the evolutionary selection of these functions but
evaluates them with regard to the present environment.
Schramme, however, criticizes that this model lacks a plausible
model of the “psychological species design” with regard to
survival and reproduction. The fourth model is the ‘value-
theory’, for which there is no established psychological
account. This model determines functions according to their
contribution to human welfare and the good human life. A
mental function thus allows for the individual to live a good life.
However, such a theory is always at risk of confounding a certain
way of life with mental health.14The NeMUP researchers found that executive dysfunctions are related to offense
status rather than pedophilic preference (68). Furthermore, they revealed that
offenders and non-offenders differed in age, intelligence, educational level and
experience of childhood sexual abuse, whereas pedophiles and non-pedophiles
mainly differed in sexual characteristics (e.g., additional paraphilias) (69). When
they compared convicted and non-convicted pedophilic child sexual offenders,
they found only two significant differences between the two groups. The convicted
offenders had a higher interest in prepubescent children and had committed
significantly more sexual offenses against children compared to non-convicted
subjects (70). However, significant differences regarding clinical characteristics,
inhibition performances, neuronal activation, empathy and impulsiveness
between the two groups were not found (70).DISCUSSING THE DISORDER STATUS OF
PEDOPHILIC DISORDER AND ASPD
As we have argued, in both the definitions of ASPD and
Pedophilic Disorder behavior harmful to others or even criminal
behavior is a criterion for the diagnosis of a mental disorder.
If we thus conclude that ASPD and Pedophilic Disorder are
just a “medicalization” of vice conditions, we have to ask whether
and, if so, how these diagnoses can still be justified within a
medical model.
Neurobiological Findings in Pedophilic
Disorder and ASPD
The most influential argument to justify the diagnoses of ASPD
and Pedophilic Disorder within a medical model seems to be a
“conservative” one. These diagnoses are well established, they
have a long clinical tradition and some prognostic utility (18).
This supports the argument that they should only be changed if
there is strong empirical evidence that another nosological
construct is more valid than the established ones.
The idea of a validation of the existing nosological constructs is
pursued by researchers investigating underlying neurobiological
and neuropsychological alterations in persons with ASPD or
Pedophilic Disorder. There is a growing body of research
indicating that there might be deviations in the brains of
persons with ASPD and Pedophilic Disorder. However, the
interpretation of these findings needs to be handled with care:
Are the neurobiological deviations a sign of a pathology, or a sign
of a vulnerability, or a consequence of a disease, or only a normal
variant? And further, can these neurobiological differences
causally explain the behavior (at least partly)?
For ASPD, studies show structural and functional deviations
mainly in the areas of the amygdala, the striatum and the
prefrontal cortex (43, 57, 63). Genetic etiological studies
suggest an association of a gene x environment interaction of
MAOA enzyme deficiency and childhood maltreatment with
antisocial behavior (57, 63). Evidence for developmental factors
in the etiology of ASPD comes from studies that suggest a link
between prenatal factors, such as birth complications, maternal
smoking and alcohol consumption during pregnancy, orFrontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 9prenatal nutritional deficiency, and the occurrence of antisocial
and violent behavior (57, 64). Also, an association between
maltreatment during childhood and maternal withdrawal in
infancy and ASPD has been found (64). These findings
suggest, that biological and social factors play a role in the
development of ASPD, while “the presence of both factors
exponentially increases the rates of antisocial and violent
behavior” (64) (p. 4).
For Pedophilic Disorder, reduced amygdala volumes were found
in several studies (65, 66). The association between pedophilia and
increased rates of left-handedness, more head injuries before age
thirteen, and lower intelligence suggest that neurodevelopmental
factors play a role in the development of pedophilia (66). These
findings support, though do not prove, the idea of underlying
neurobiological alterations in Pedophilic Disorder.
However, most of the studies have severe methodological flaws.
For Pedophilic Disorder, most of the studies show a sampling
bias in investigating only incarcerated pedophilic child sexual
offenders with very scant evidence on non-offending pedophiles
(65, 66). It is thus not clear whether alterations found in the
brains of pedophilic child sexual offenders are causally
contributing to their pedophilic preference itself or whether
they are rather associated with offending in general by, for
example, contributing to diminished behavioral control or
lower intelligence. The latter assumption is supported by a
MRT study by Schiffer et al. (67), which provided first
evidence that child sexual offending in pedophilia rather than
pedophilia alone is associated with structural brain differences.
Their study was published in the context of the German multi-
sided research network NeMUP that investigated differences
between pedophilic and non-pedophilic men, between child
sexual offenders and non-offenders, and between convicted and
non-convicted (pedophilic) child offenders.14
In the case of ASPD, the main methodological problem seems
to be confounding variables, since most of the persons with ASPD
show psychiatric comorbidities like substance use disorder or
mood disorders (43). Another problem is the questionable
homogeneity of persons that fulfill the criteria of ASPD. A study
by Gregory et al. (71), for example, found significant differences in
gray matter volume in the prefrontal cortex between offenders
with ASPD and additional psychopathic traits and offenders with
ASPD without psychopathic traits, but not between offenders with
ASPD without psychopathic traits and non-offenders.
These findings show the need for better study designs to get
more reliable results. However, even if we get better results, we still
face the general problem of interpreting neurobiologicalSeptember 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 558655
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difference is not equivalent to a dysfunction, understood in
psychological terms. The question of dysfunction is superior to
it. An atypical structure or function of the amygdala, for example,
is not per se dysfunctional or pathological. The assessment of its
dysfunctionality depends on its assumed effects on the
psychological and behavioral level, and how these effects are
evaluated. An atypical function of the amygdala could even be
evaluated as advantageous because it is associated with
less anxiety.
Dysfunction in Pedophilic Disorder and
ASPD
A crucial point in any discussion about the disorder status of a
mental condition is the question if there is a convincing model of
dysfunction, understood in psychological terms.
Pedophilic Disorder
With regard to pedophilia, one could argue under an evolutionary
account of dysfunction, that it is a form of a sexual dysfunction,
assuming that the biologically defined function of sexual arousal
(i.e. the reason the mechanism of sexual arousal was selected for)
lies in its contribution to (potential) reproduction (72) (p. 499),
which is clearly not the case in pedophilic sexual behavior. This,
however, is an insufficient model of the function of human
sexuality. Human sexuality has important functions beyond
reproduction, particularly promoting pair bonding and fulfilling
emotional needs. Many forms of sexuality that do not pursue
reproduction are broadly accepted, e.g. sexual intercourse of
infertile people, under birth control, or homosexuality.
Furthermore, there is no reason not to use a certain function for
other, possibly purely hedonistic purposes that have nothing to do
with its evolutionary function. The fact that a function is used for
other than the alleged evolutionary purposes does not mean that
this is dysfunctional.
Some pedophilic men actually state that they are not only
interested in sexual contact with children but also look for
romantic relationships with them (73). The dysfunction in
Pedophilic Disorder thus cannot simply stem from the fact that
the sexual arousal is not associated with (potential) reproduction.
The concept of a dysfunction in an evolutionary sense falls too
short here.
According to DSM-5 and ICD-11, a pedophilic sexual interest
is only deemed a mental disorder when it leads to subjective
distress or impairment, or has been acted upon.
To assume that having certain sexual fantasies or urges is not
pathological but acting according to them is, seems inconsistent.
It might be explained by the implicit assumption that there is
another dysfunction involved, namely an impaired ability to
control one’s behavior. To illustrate this point: if a heterosexual
teleiophilic man (i.e. a man sexually attracted to physically
mature individuals) sexually assaults a woman, it is not
generally supposed that he must be mentally disordered
because he couldn’t control his sexual urges. For it is just as
possible that he thought the assault was justified, e.g. because the
woman dressed “lewdly”. There is no reason to regard the case ofFrontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 10the heterosexual teleiophilic sexual offender differently from the
case of a pedophilic sexual offender who is convinced that his
behavior is morally justified, or who just does not respect the
rights of children.
Moser (74) rightly argues that a diagnosis of a paraphilia does
not imply a lack of the ability to control one’s behavior: “Those
individuals who cannot control their sexual impulses may qualify
for another diagnosis based upon their inability to control their
impulses, but not based upon the specific sexual behavior.”
(p. 323).
This analysis shows that a model of dysfunction measured by
moral standards is employed for Pedophilic Disorder. This
argument is supported by the fact that the appraisal of sexual
activities with children depends on historical and cultural
contexts and has been accepted at varying times and cultures
(22). This, of course, does not morally justify sexual acts with
children. Only cultural relativists would conclude that sexual acts
involving children are morally permissible because they are
accepted in some cultures. We, however, regard child sexual
abuse as a violation of universal human rights, including
children’s rights. Thus, the fact that child sexual abuse is not
sanctioned in some countries is no valid argument against its
moral wrongness and its legal prohibition.
ASPD
In the case of ASPD, one could argue that antisocial behavior
represents a dysfunction in social functioning. This argument
implicitly presupposes that prosocial behavior is normal human
behavior. However, under an evolutionary account, in many or
even most societies during human history antisocial behavior
was probably “adaptive” because it was the “normal and efficient”
way to success, both in terms of reproduction and material
wealth. Only in civilized societies governed by the rule of law,
antisocial behavior becomes less adaptive than prosocial
behavior and is considered abnormal and dysfunctional.
Some authors suggested that psychopathy could also be
understood in evolutionary terms due to frequency-based
selection as “adaptive” behavior (49, 75). According to this idea,
a society with a prosocial majority can tolerate a small number of
psychopaths that pursue their goals without being restrained by
“other-regarding norms”. Reimer (49) argues that the typical
personality traits of psychopaths, like experiencing less anxiety
and being able to resist attempts of “moral” social reinforcing, can
also be understood as advantageous under a pro-individualist
account of human existence. Maibom argues that psychopathy is
not a disorder at all, but “from a certain perspective, what we call
deficits are actually advantages” (75) (p. 34).PRACTICAL ARGUMENTS FOR
CONSIDERING PEDOPHILIC DISORDER
AND ASPD AS MENTAL DISORDERS
Classifying something as a mental disorder is not only a
theoretical question, but also has practical implications that
need to be considered.September 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 558655
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help (11, 43). For ASPD, individuals presumably often don’t feel
pain and thus have no motivation to change their condition (46).
For Pedophilic Disorder, the possible reasons for not seeking
help range from not feeling distressed by it, or not recognizing its
potential harmfulness towards others to a lack of knowledge
about possibilities to get help and shame and fear of
stigmatization (76).
However, as the study of Levenson et al. (76) also shows, some
persons with Pedophilic Disorder are willing to get help. As an
example, the Dunkelfeld (“dark field”) project in Berlin,
Germany, a voluntary prevention project for pedophilic men at
risk of offending, shows that a significant number of pedophiles
seeks help (77).
In many countries, the diagnosis of a mental disorder justifies
treatment within the publicly funded health system. For that
reason, the diagnoses of ASPD and Pedophilic Disorder can
serve a useful purpose for individuals who feel distressed by their
condition. If the health system with its long clinical experience
can offer help, then it should do so (72).
However, the question is whether we need the diagnoses of
Pedophilic Disorder and ASPD so that these persons can get
help. For social problems social institutions outside the health
system could be conceivable that offer help. Even if these
diagnoses were removed from the diagnostic manuals, people
could get help within the health system for comorbid conditions
like depression or anxiety disorder if these mainly cause their
personal distress. In the case of paraphilias, Moser et al. argue
that “other psychological characteristics describe these
individuals and their concerns more accurately than their
sexual interests do” (20). Indeed, 93% of a sample of
pedophilic sex offenders showed psychiatric comorbidities,
mostly mood and anxiety disorders and substance use
disorders (78). ASPD is also associated with anxiety disorders
and substance use disorders. For the latter a prevalence of 80–
85% among persons with ASPD was reported (43).
One could object that these comorbidities possibly are a
consequence of the Pedophilic Disorder or ASPD and
therefore the focus of treatment should be the Pedophilic
Disorder or ASPD as the primary condition. However, the fact
that there are almost no effective treatments for Pedophilic
Disorder or ASPD yet indicates that what actually can be
treated within the health system might rather be associated
disorders like depression, anxiety, or substance use disorder
and not ASPD or Pedophilic Disorder itself.
Both, ASPD and Pedophilic Disorder, are supposed to be
associated, besides others, with neurodevelopmental factors (57,
66), which makes it difficult to therapeutically intervene as late as
in adulthood. The goal of therapies is thus rather the prevention
of future deviant behavior in order to avoid harm to others. As
Seto (79) puts it regarding Pedophilic Disorder: “Instead of a
‘cure’, the focus of treatments for nonoffending individuals with
pedophilia or hebephilia is the development of more effective
self-management, to prevent sexual offending.” (p. 209).
The idea of drug treatment with antiandrogens or GnRH
analogs (androgen deprivation therapy, ADT) in PedophilicFrontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 11Disorder is not to change sexual preference but to reduce sex
drive and thereby reduce the risk of (re-)offending. There is, until
now, very limited evidence of the efficacy of ADT, and the level of
willingness to undergo this kind of treatment is quite low (79,
80). Furthermore, according to a review of studies on behavioral
and cognitive–behavioral treatments of pedophilia, there is no
reliable evidence of their long-term efficacy (23). There are,
however, few hints that it might be possible to actually modify
sexual interest in children by, for example, strengthening self-
esteem, coping skills, emotional self-regulation, and relationship
skills in order to enable men with a sexual interest in children to
fulfill their emotional and sexual needs with adult partners (81).
Studies on specific techniques, like masturbatory reconditioning
in order to suppress deviant sexual interests and/or enhance
normative sexual interests, show scant evidence of their efficacy
to date (82).
For ASPD, a meta-analysis by Wilson (83) shows no
significant effects of treatments. A lack of high-quality studies
and small sample sizes might contribute to these findings. Better
designed studies with larger sample sizes are required for
future research.
It seems necessary to classify ASPD and Pedophilic Disorder
as mental disorders in order to facilitate further research on
them, gain better insights into their etiology, and develop new
therapies. The example of the “psychopathy”-concept, however,
shows that there can be a lot of research on a concept without
being an official diagnosis in DSM and ICD (44). The
psychopathy-checklist (PCL-R) is widely used in forensic
contexts to reliably assess the risk potential of criminals with
psychopathic traits (24). Since psychopathy does not need to be a
diagnosis in DSM and ICD to be a broadly applied concept, it
seems that ASPD and Pedophilic Disorder do not need it either.
Similar to psychopathy, ASPD and Pedophilic Disorder are
most relevant in forensic contexts (25, 38). Apart from clinical
utility, the forensic implications of these diagnoses need to be
considered. According to Sexually Violent Predator laws in many
U.S. states, sex offenders with a “mental abnormality” and a high
risk of re-offending can be indefinitely committed after the
prison sentence to protect society from them (84). Even
though “mental abnormality” is a legal term referring to an
impairment in emotional and volitional capacity that predisposes
to the commission of criminal sexual acts and not synonymous
with “mental disorder” (85), the diagnosis of a paraphilic
disorder, as specified in DSM, is practically mostly accepted as
sufficient to ascertain “mental abnormality” (86). Regarding
these severe consequences, the definition of the paraphilic
disorders in DSM seems especially critical.CONCLUSIONS
“Vice-Laden Disorders” in Psychiatry
Diagnoses that primarily rely on behavior harmful to others, like
Pedophilic Disorder and ASPD, fall out of the general disease
concept. They even do not meet the general criteria of mental
disorders as defined by DSM-5 or the “harmful dysfunction”September 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 558655
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individual himself, nor the criterion of a dysfunction are met
in these two diagnoses.15 Instead, they rely on another disease
criterion: the criterion of harm to others. Psychiatry brings itself
into great conceptual difficulties by making behavior harmful to
others/criminal behavior a central part of the definition of some
mental disorders, while at the same time lacking a clear concept
of dysfunction in these cases. When diagnoses are formulated in
a way that makes it possible to apply them to mere antisocial and
criminal behavior, psychiatry is at risk of confounding the
medical and the moral.
Furthermore, the purely behavioral diagnoses do not reveal
whether the behavior is based on a mental dysfunction or
whether it was chosen voluntarily or for specific reasons.
Therefore, the formulation of the criteria sets of “vice-laden”
disorders needs to be done very cautiously in order to avoid a
confusion between criminal/immoral behavior and mental
disorder. It should not be possible that harming others/
criminal behavior defines a mental disorder. A psychiatric
diagnosis should not only rely on observable behavior, but
consider psychological, cognitive, or affective factors as well.
After considering the arguments for and against the disorder-
status of Pedophilic Disorder and ASPD, we come to different
conclusions regarding both diagnoses.
The Disorder-Status of Pedophilic
Disorder
In the case of Pedophilic Disorder, we think that the diagnosis
should be kept but reformulated in accordance with the general
definition of mental disorder in DSM-5 in order to make it
consistent with a medical model of mental disorder. This means
it should only be applicable to individuals that are distressed or
impaired by it so that they can get treatment within the health
system. It should not be possible to make the diagnosis solely
based on behavior harmful to others. Therefore, we suggest
reformulating Criterion B of Pedophilic Disorder as follows:
“The sexual urges or fantasies cause marked distress or
interpersonal difficulty (e.g. in the context of occupation,
family life, friendships, intimate life).” That means, the
criterion “The individual has acted on these sexual urges”
is cancelled.
Our suggested reformulation of Criterion B is indeed
consistent with the form it already had in DSM-IV. As De
Block et al. (87) note, the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria were “by
far the most consistent vis-à-vis the DSM’s own definition of
mental disorder” (p. 291). It was, however, criticized that this
criteria set leads to the situation that someone acting on his
pedophilic interests without feeling distressed would not be
considered mentally ill (88). O’Donohoe et al. (89) argue that
rather the lack of experiencing subjective distress when being
sexually attracted to children than the experience of distress is a15However, this conclusion is not equally applicable to definitions of mental
disorder that do not require that the individual recognizes the harmful
consequences of his condition, like the definition of Graham (59).
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according to DSM-IV, a “contended pedophile” does not meet
the criteria of a mental disorder. They argue that a person
sexually interested in children must be considered in some way
socially impaired “because societal norms dictate that it is
abnormal for a person to be sexually interested in children”
(p. 102). They clearly want to classify pedophilia as a mental
disorder for social and forensic rather than for medical
reasons. Their postulation that “a single instance of sexual
behavior with a child should be sufficient to label someone as
having a disorder” (89) (p. 103) confounds criminal behavior
with mental disorder.
If pedophilia by itself is not a mental disorder according to
DSM-5, then acting according to it cannot be a mental disorder
unless there is clear evidence of a dysfunction of volitional
control. Impairment of volitional control, however, is not
implied in the diagnosis of a paraphilic disorder (85). If we
assume that sometimes such impairment is given, then it
probably stems from another disease (like e.g. dementia, a
brain tumor or mental retardation). If there is no such
impairment, we have to assume that this person acted
deliberately, and it is not clear why this should be a sign of a
mental disorder rather than simply a criminal act.
The DSM-5 warns of the dangers of using a diagnostic
manual developed for clinical purposes in the forensic context.
For assigning mental disorder in the legal sense “additional
information is usually required beyond that contained in the
DSM-5 diagnosis, which might include information about the
individual’s functional impairments and how these impairments
affect the particular abilities in question” (3) (p. 25).
It is important to note that there is a difference between a
mental disorder and the US-American legal concept of
“mental abnormality”.
We suggest that it should be possible to diagnose a “mental
abnormality” in the forensic sense for a person with pedophilia
who is neither distressed nor impaired by his pedophilic
condition (i.e., who fulfills criterion A but not B according to
our suggestion). Even though this person does not meet the
criteria of a mental disorder as suggested by us, he might still
meet the concept of “mental abnormality” if there is evidence of a
high risk of reoffending. We thus suggest that this difference in
clinical and forensic use is clearly annotated in the diagnostic
criteria of Pedophilic Disorder in DSM. This suggestion is
important with regard to other countries than the USA. The
DSM is used worldwide for research, and therefore its diagnostic
criteria should not be distorted in order to adapt them to the US
legal system. In Germany, for example, no diagnosis of a mental
disorder is required to order preventive detention after
imprisonment; rather the assessment of danger and the
prognosis of the probability of recidivism is decisive.
Our intention is not to protect the “contented pedophile”, as
long as he is dangerous, from preventive detention or to
downplay the harm that child molesters do to their victims in
any sense. On the other hand, our suggestion is not meant to
preclude the detained child molester from getting treatment if at
some point he starts to show insight into his problems and wantsSeptember 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 558655
Münch et al. Behavior Harmful to Othersto get treated. Rather, we want to separate the medical aspects of
Pedophilic Disorder from the societal and forensic implications.
To summarize, our suggestion is as follows. We agree with the
differentiation between Pedophilia and Pedophilic Disorder in
DSM-5 and suggest adding a category “Pedophilia with mental
abnormality” for forensic purposes. Thus, we suggest defining
Pedophilia as pedophilic preference without distress/impairment;
Pedophilic Disorder as pedophilic preference with distress/
impairment; and Pedophilia with mental abnormality as
pedophilic preference with sexual offending and high risk of re-
offending with or without distress/impairment.
The Disorder-Status of ASPD
In the case of ASPD, however, we think that the arguments to
remove it as a distinct diagnosis from the diagnostic manuals are
stronger than the ones to keep it. Especially the presumed lack of
personal distress of individuals with ASPD and the strong
correlation with criminal behavior and incarceration indicate that
this diagnosis ismore of a social than amere health-related problem.
We agree with Kröber and Lau (15) who said: “If those with
antisocial personalities, like anyone else, are subject to social
influences and learning processes, they act as rational and
competent citizens; their decision against behaving in compliance
with standards should not be considered as pathologic.” (p. 687).
Herpertz and Sass (90) warn of the consequences of
confounding antisocial behavior with “real” disorders in forensic
psychiatry: “If the forensic psychiatrist fails to distinguish clearly
between simple antisocial behaviour and a profound disturbance
in personality, psychiatry runs the risk of being charged with
handling all kinds of recurrent social deviance and delinquency.
This would greatly hamper our capacity to treat those offenders
who show real and treatable mental disorders.” (90).
As Gert & Culver (41) put it: “If psychiatry is to take its place
as a branch of medicine, mental disorders, like physical
disorders, should be limited to conditions that cause harm to
the person with the disorder.” (p. 489).
We think that the implementation of a dimensional model of
personality disorders, as introduced by ICD-11, will mitigate the
problem of attributing a diagnosis of mental disorder to mere
criminal behavior. The ICD-11 does not contain the diagnosis
“Dissocial Personality Disorder” anymore. Antisocial or dissocial
personality traits will then be a specifier among others in the
diagnosis of a general personality disorder. Thus, with this new
model, the focus will hopefully be more on the cognitive, affective
and interpersonal dimensions of personality disorders while
avoiding an overly focus on deviant behavior.Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 13To summarize: We suggest removing ASPD from the DSM, and
support the planned removal of the diagnosis DPD from the ICD-11.
Practical Implications
Our suggestion to remove or reformulate the “vice-laden”
diagnoses does not imply the demand for stopping research on
them—quite the contrary. Especially in the forensic context, it is
important to find opportunities to effectively prevent their
harmful consequences and develop treatment methods insofar
this is possible. The concept of psychopathy shows that an official
diagnosis is not necessary for research to be done on forensically
relevant conditions.
Regarding Pedophilic Disorder, our suggestions strongly
support therapeutic offers (like the Dunkelfeld project) for
people who feel distressed or impaired by their condition and
seek help.
Regarding antisocial behavior, we think that it is much more
of a social problem that has to be addressed more by other
societal systems than the health system.
Finally, our suggestions have legal implications in some
legal systems. Particularly for the USA, we suggest adding
the category of “pedophilia with mental abnormality” in
DSM for forensic use in order to separate the clinical and
forensic aspects of pedophilia. However, the requirements of
the legal systems in some countries are no valid argument
against clear conceptual differentiations in the psychiatric
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Publication Fund of Charité—Universitätsmedizin Berlin.REFERENCES
1. Hucklenbroich P. “Disease entity” as the key theoretical concept of medicine.
J Med Philos (2014) 39(6):609–33. doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhu040
2. Hucklenbroich P. “Die wissenschaftstheoretische Struktur der medizinischen
Krankheitslehre”. In: Hucklenbroich P, Buyx A, editors.Wissenschaftstheoretische
Aspekte des Krankheitsbegriffs. Münster: mentis (2013). p. 13–83
3. American Psychiatric Association.Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental
disorders: DSM-5. American Psychiatric Association: Arlington, VA (2013)4. Wakefield JC. The concept of mental disorder: on the boundary between
biological facts and social values. Am Psychol (1992) 47(3):373. doi: 10.1037//
0003-066x.47.3.373
5. Charland LC. Moral nature of the DSM-IV Cluster B personality
disorders. J Pers Disord (2006) 20(2):116–25. doi: 10.1521/pedi.2006.
20.2.116
6. Sadler JZ. Vice and the diagnostic classification of mental disorders: a
philosophical case conference. Philos Psychiatr Psychol (2008) 15(1):1–17.
doi: 10.1353/ppp.0.0152September 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 558655
Münch et al. Behavior Harmful to Others7. Szasz TS. The myth of mental illness. Am Psychol (1960) 15(2):113. doi:
10.1037/h0046535
8. Boorse C. What a theory of mental health should be. J Theory Soc Behav
(1976) 6(1):61–84. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5914.1976.tb00359.x
9. Phillips J, Frances A, Cerullo MA, Chardavoyne J, Decker HS, First MB, et al.
The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: a pluralogue part 1:
conceptual and definitional issues in psychiatric diagnosis. Philos Ethics
Humanit Med (2012) 7:3. doi: 10.1186/1747-5341-7-3
10. Bingham R, Banner N. The definition of mental disorder: evolving but
dysfunctional? J Med Ethics (2014) 40(8):537–42. doi: 10.1136/medethics-
2013-101661
11. Malon A. Pedophilia: a diagnosis in search of a disorder. Arch Sex Behav
(2012) 41(5):1083–97. doi: 10.1007/s10508-012-9919-5
12. Sisti D, Young M, Caplan A. Defining mental illnesses: can values and objectivity
get along? BMC Psychiatry (2013) 13:346. doi: 10.1186/1471-244x-13-346
13. World Health Organization. The ICD-10 Classification of Mental and of
Behavioural Disorders: clinical description and diagnostic guidelines. World
Health Organization: Geneva (1992)
14. Sadler JZ. “Values in psychiatric diagnosis and classification”. In: Fulford K,
Davies M, Gipps RGT, Graham G, Sadler JZ, Stanghellini G, et al editors. The
Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University
Press. (2013). p. 753–78. doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199579563.001.0001
15. Kröber HL, Lau S. Bad or Mad? Personality disorders and legal responsibility
—the German situation. Behav Sci Law (2000) 18(5):679–90. doi: 10.1002/
1099-0798(200010)18:5<679::AID-BSL405>3.0.CO;2-L
16. Habermeyer E. “Sicherungsverwahrung gemäß § 66 StGB”. In: Venzlaff U,
Dreßing H, Habermeyer E, Bork S, editors. Psychiatrische Begutachtung: ein
praktisches Handbuch für Ärzte und Juristen, hrsg. von Harald Dreßing und
Elmar Habermeyer. 6th revised and extended edition. München: Elsevier,
Urban & Fischer (2015) p. 405–11
17. Frances A, Nardo JM. ICD-11 should not repeat the mistakes made by DSM-
5. Br J Psychiatry (2013) 203(1):1–2. doi: 10.1192/bjp.bp.113.127647
18. Phillips J, Frances A, Cerullo MA, Chardavoyne J, Decker HS, First MB, et al.
The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: a pluralogue part 2:
Issues of conservatism and pragmatism in psychiatric diagnosis. Philos Ethics
Humanit Med (2012) 7:8. doi: 10.1186/1747-5341-7-8
19. Frances A. Saving normal: An insider’s revolt against out-of-control psychiatric
diagnosis, DSM-5, Big Pharma, and the medicalization of ordinary life.
William Morrow & Co: New York (2013)
20. Moser C, Kleinplatz PJ. DSM-IV-TR and the paraphilias: An argument for
removal. J Psychol Hum Sex (2006) 17(3-4):91–109. doi: 10.1300/J056v17n03_05
21. Lieb H. “Persönlichkeitsstörung”: zur Kritik eines widersinnigen Konzeptes.
Dgvt-Verlag: Tübingen (1998)
22. Green R. Is pedophilia a mental disorder? Arch Sex Behav (2002) 31(6):467–
71; discussion: 479–503. doi: 10.1023/a:1020699013309
23. Seto MC. Pedophilia. Annu Rev Clin Psychol (2009) 5:391–407. doi: 10.1146/
annurev.clinpsy.032408.153618
24. Hare RD, Neumann CS. Psychopathy: Assessment and forensic
implications. Can J Psychiatry (2009) 54(12):791–802. doi: 10.1177/
070674370905401202
25. Ogloff JR. Psychopathy/antisocial personality disorder conundrum. Aust N Z J
Psychiatry (2006) 40(6-7):519–28. doi: 10.1080/j.1440-1614.2006.01834.x
26. Sadler JZ. “Vice and mental disorders” In: Fulford K, Davies M, Gipps RGT,
Graham G, Sadler JZ, Stanghellini G, et al., editors. The Oxford Handbook of
Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2013), 451–79.
doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199579563.001.0001
27. Blanchard R. A dissenting opinion on DSM-5 pedophilic disorder. Arch Sex
Behav (2013) 42(5):675–8. doi: 10.1007/s10508-013-0117-x
28. Beech AR, Miner MH, Thornton D. Paraphilias in the DSM-5. Annu Rev Clin
Psychol (2016) 12:383–406. doi: 10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-021815-093330
29. American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental
disorders: DSM-IV. 4th edition. American Psychiatric Association:
Washington DC (1994)
30. American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental
disorders: DSM-IV-TR. 4th edition. American Psychiatric Association:
Washington DC (2000)
31. Seto MC, Fedoroff JP, Bradford JM, Knack N, Rodrigues NC, Curry S, et al.
Reliability and validity of the DSM-IV-TR and proposed DSM-5 criteria forFrontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 14pedophilia: Implications for the ICD-11 and the next DSM. Int J Law
Psychiatry (2016) 49(Pt A):98–106. doi: 10.1016/j.ijlp.2016.08.002
32. Balon R. Politics of diagnostic criteria: specifiers of pedophilic disorder in
DSM-5. Arch Sex Behav (2014) 43(7):1235–6. doi: 10.1007/s10508-013-0246-2
33. Briken P, Fedoroff JP, Bradford JW. Why can’t pedophilic disorder remit?
Arch Sex Behav (2014) 43(7):1237–9. doi: 10.1007/s10508-014-0323-1
34. World Health Organization. International Statistical Classification of Diseases
and Related Health Problems. 11th revision. World Health Organization.
(2018). [March 3, 2020]. Available at: https://icd.who.int/browse11/l-m/en#/
http%3a%2f%2fid.who.int%2ficd%2fentity%2f517058174
35. United Nations Children’s Fund. Ending Child Marriage: Progress and
prospects. UNICEF: New York (2014). [March 03, 2020]. Available at:
https://www.unicef.org/media/files/Child_Marriage_Report_7_17_LR.pdf
36. World Policy Analysis Center. What is the minimum age of marriage for girls?




37. Seto MC, Cantor JM, Blanchard R. Child pornography offenses are a valid
diagnostic indicator of pedophilia. J Abnorm Psychol (2006) 115(3):610. doi:
10.1037/0021-843X.115.3.610
38. First MB. DSM-5 and paraphilic disorders. J Am Acad Psychiatry Law (2014)
42(2):191–201
39. Knack N, Winder B, Murphy L, Fedoroff JP. Primary and secondary
prevention of child sexual abuse. Int Rev Psychiatry (2019) 31(2):181–94.
doi: 10.1080/09540261.2018.1541872
40. Strassberg DS, Eastvold A, Wilson Kenney J, Suchy Y. Psychopathy among
pedophilic and nonpedophilic child molesters. Child Abuse Negl (2012) 36
(4):379–82. doi: 10.1016/j.chiabu.2011.09.018
41. Gert B, Culver CM. Sex, immorality, and mental disorders. J Med Philos
(2009) 34(5):487–95. doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhp037
42. Hübner D, White L. Neurosurgery for psychopaths? An ethical analysis. AJOB
Neurosci (2016) 7(3):140–9. doi: 10.1080/21507740.2016.1218376
43. Glenn AL, Johnson AK, Raine A. Antisocial personality disorder: a current
review. Curr Psychiatry Rep (2013) 15(12):427. doi: 10.1007/s11920-013-
0427-7
44. Crego C, Widiger TA. Psychopathy and the DSM. J Pers (2015) 83(6):665–77.
doi: 10.1111/jopy.12115
45. Habermeyer E, Dreßing H. “Persönlichkeitsstörungen”. In: Venzlaff U,
Dreßing H, Habermeyer E, Bork S, editors. Psychiatrische Begutachtung: ein
praktisches Handbuch für Ärzte und Juristen, hrsg. von Harald Dreßing und
Elmar Habermeyer. 6th revised and extended. München: Elsevier, Urban &
Fischer (2015). p. 292–306
46. Reid WH, Gacono C. Treatment of antisocial personality, psychopathy, and
other characterologic antisocial syndromes. Behav Sci Law (2000) 18(5):647–
62. doi: 10.1002/1099-0798(200010)18:5<647::AID-BSL407>3.0.CO;2-O
47. Müller-Isberner R, Eucker S, Rohner A, Eusterschulte B. “Unterbringung im
Maßregelvollzug gemäß § 63 StGB”. In: Venzlaff U, Dreßing H, Habermeyer E,
Bork S, editors. Psychiatrische Begutachtung: ein praktisches Handbuch für Ärzte
und Juristen, hrsg von Harald Dreßing und Elmar Habermeyer. 6th revised and
extended edition. München: Elsevier, Urban & Fischer (2015). p. 363–87
48. Fazel S, Danesh J. Serious mental disorder in 23000 prisoners: a systematic
review of 62 surveys. Lancet (2002) 359(9306):545–50. doi: 10.1016/s0140-
6736(02)07740-1
49. Reimer M. Psychopathy without (the language of) disorder. Neuroethics
(2008) 1(3):185–98. doi: 10.1007/s12152-008-9017-5
50. Herpertz SC. Neue Wege der Klassifikation von Persönlichkeitsstörungen in
ICD-11. Fortschr Neurol Psychiatr (2018) 86(03):150–5. doi: 10.1055/a-0576-
7149
51. Hucklenbroich P. “Der Krankheitsbegriff der Medizin in der Perspektive einer
rekonstruktiven Wissenschaftstheorie”. In: Rothhaar M, Frewer A, editors.
Das Gesunde, das Kranke und die Medizinethik. Moralische Implikationen des
Krankheitsbegriffs. Stuttgart: Steiner (2012). p. 33–6
52. Frommel M. Pädosexualität und Sexualpolitik der Parteien: Eine Debatte, bei
der fast alle im Glashaus sitzen, sich aber dennoch gern mit Steinen bewerfen.
Kritische Justiz (2014) 47(1):46–56. doi: 10.5771/0023-4834-2014-1-46
53. Institut für Demokratieforschung, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen. Die
Pädophiliedebatte bei den Grünen im programmatischen und gesellschaftlichenSeptember 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 558655
Münch et al. Behavior Harmful to OthersKontext. Erste und vorläufige Befunde zum Forschungsprojekt. (2013). [March
18, 2020]. Available at: http://www.demokratie-goettingen.de/content/
uploads/2013/12/Paedophiliedebatte-Gruene-Zwischenbericht.pdf
54. Gilbert F, Focquaert F. Rethinking responsibility in offenders with acquired
paedophilia: punishment or treatment? Int J Law Psychiatry (2015) 38:51–60.
doi: 10.1016/j.ijlp.2015.01.007
55. Sartori G, Scarpazza C, Codognotto S, Pietrini P. An unusual case of acquired
pedophilic behavior following compression of orbitofrontal cortex and
hypothalamus by a Clivus Chordoma. J Neurol (2016) 263(7):1454–5.
doi: 10.1007/s00415-016-8143-y
56. Camperio Ciani AS, Scarpazza C, Covelli V, Battaglia U. Profiling acquired
pedophilic behavior: Retrospective analysis of 66 Italian forensic cases of
pedophilia. Int J Law Psychiatry (2019) 67:101508. doi: 10.1016/j.ijlp.2019.101508
57. Raine A. Antisocial personality as a neurodevelopmental disorder. Annu Rev
Clin Psychol (2018) 14:259–89. doi: 10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-050817-084819
58. Trebuchon A, Bartolomei F, McGonigal A, Laguitton V, Chauvel P. Reversible
antisocial behavior in ventromedial prefrontal lobe epilepsy. Epilepsy Behav
(2013) 29(2):367–73. doi: 10.1016/j.yebeh.2013.08.007
59. Graham G. The disordered mind. An introduction to philosophy of mind and
mental illness. 2nd edition. London: Routledge (2013)
60. Heinz A, Müller S, Rosenthal A. Was ist “normal”, was ist “krank”?
Krankheitsbegriff und Diagnostik in der Psychiatrie. Spectr Psychiatr (2016)
4:10–3
61. Heinz A. Der Begriff der psychischen Krankheit. 2nd ed. Berlin: Suhrkamp (2015)
62. Schramme T. Can we define mental disorder by using the criterion of mental
dysfunction? Theor Med Bioeth (2010) 31(1):35–47. doi: 10.1007/s11017-010-
9136-y
63. Ling S, Umbach R, Raine A. Biological explanations of criminal behavior.
Psychol Crime Law (2019) 25(6):626–40. doi: 10.1080/1068316x.2019.1572753
64. Guillen Gonzalez D, Bittlinger M, Erk S, Müller S. Neuroscientific and genetic
evidence in criminal cases: a double-edged sword in Germany but not in the
United States? Front Psychol (2019) 10:2343. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02343
65. Mohnke S, Müller S, Amelung T, Kruger TH, Ponseti J, Schiffer B, et al. Brain
alterations in paedophilia: a critical review. Prog Neurobiol (2014) 122:1–23.
doi: 10.1016/j.pneurobio.2014.07.005
66. Tenbergen G, Wittfoth M, Frieling H, Ponseti J, Walter M, Walter H, et al. The
neurobiology and psychology of pedophilia: recent advances and challenges. Front
Hum Neurosci (2015) 9:344. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2015.00344
67. Schiffer B, Amelung T, Pohl A, Kaergel C, Tenbergen G, Gerwinn H, et al.
Gray matter anomalies in pedophiles with and without a history of child
sexual offending. Transl Psychiatry (2017) 7(5):e1129. doi: 10.1038/tp.2017.96
68. Massau C, Tenbergen G, Kargel C, Weiss S, Gerwinn H, Pohl A, et al. Eecutive
functioning in pedophilia and child sexual offending. J Int Neuropsychol Soc
(2017) 23(6):460–70. doi: 10.1017/s1355617717000315
69. Gerwinn H, Weiss S, Tenbergen G, Amelung T, Fodisch C, Pohl A, et al.
Clinical characteristics associated with paedophilia and child sex offending -
Differentiating sexual preference from offence status. Eur Psychiatry (2018)
51:74–85. doi: 10.1016/j.eurpsy.2018.02.002
70. Gibbels C, Sinke C, Kneer J, Amelung T, Mohnke S, Beier KM, et al. Two sides
of one coin: a comparison of clinical and neurobiological characteristics of
convicted and non-convicted pedophilic child sexual offenders. J Clin Med
(2019) 8(7). doi: 10.3390/jcm8070947
71. Gregory S, Ffytche D, Simmons A, Kumari V, Howard M, Hodgins S, et al.
The antisocial brain: psychopathy matters. Arch Gen Psychiatry (2012) 69
(9):962–72. doi: 10.1001/archgenpsychiatry.2012.222
72. Berlin FS, Berner W, Bullough VL, Dixson AF. Peer commentaries on Green
(2002) and Schmidt (2002). Arch Sex Behav (2002) 31(6):479. doi: 10.1023/
A:1020603214218
73. Seto MC. Is pedophilia a sexual orientation? Arch Sex Behav (2012) 41(1):231–
6. doi: 10.1007/s10508-011-9882-6Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 1574. Moser C. When is an unusual sexual interest a mental disorder? Arch Sex
Behav (2009) 38(3):323–5; author reply 31-4. doi: 10.1007/s10508-008-9436-8
75. Maibom HL. To treat a psychopath. Theor Med Bioeth (2014) 35(1):31–42.
doi: 10.1007/s11017-014-9281-9
76. Levenson JS, Willis GM, Vicencio CP. Obstacles to help-seeking for sexual
offenders: implications for prevention of sexual abuse. J Child Sex Abus (2017)
26(2):99–120. doi: 10.1080/10538712.2016.1276116
77. Beier KM, Ahlers CJ, Goecker D, Neutze J, Mundt IA, Hupp E, et al. Can
pedophiles be reached for primary prevention of child sexual abuse? First
results of the Berlin Prevention Project Dunkelfeld (PPD). J Forens
Psychiatry Psychol (2009) 20(6):851–67. doi: 10.1080/14789940903
174188
78. Raymond NC, Coleman E, Ohlerking F, Christenson GA, Miner M.
Psychiatric comorbidity in pedophilic sex offenders. Am J Psychiatry (1999)
156(5):786–8. doi: 10.1176/ajp.156.5.786
79. Seto MC. Pedophilia and sexual offending against children: Theory, assessment,
and intervention. 2nd Edition. Washington, DC: American Psychological
Association (2018)
80. Amelung T, Kuhle LF, Konrad A, Pauls A, Beier KM. Androgen deprivation
therapy of self-identifying, help-seeking pedophiles in the Dunkelfeld. Int J
Law Psychiatry (2012) 35(3):176–84. doi: 10.1016/j.ijlp.2012.02.005
81. Marshall WL. Are pedophiles treatable? Evidence from North American
studies. Seksuologia Polska (2008) 6(1):39–43
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